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  Abstract
  The participation conditionality linked to the PRSP creates a wide 
range of problems. It is too ambitious to be workable, too vague to be moni-
tored. The pragmatic way out has been for the Breton Woods institutions to 
be uncommonly lenient in the verification of this conditionality. Governments 
can thus get away with a semblance of civil society consultation. Rwanda’s 
a case in point. We try to show that there has been very little civil society 
participation, and that any other outcome would have been quite unlikely, 
possibly even undesirable. We argue that donors should dramatically tune 
down their ambitions, and set country-specific, limited but firm benchmarks 
that a government must respect in its relations with civil society. If this had 
been done from the initial stages of the Rwandan PRSP, some small but sig-
nificant steps forward could have been taken that stand in stark contrast with 
the hollow ‘participation’ actually offered to civil society in some limited 
areas where it was not ready to rise to the challenge, while at the same time 
the donor community did little to protect civil society when the regime was 
clamping down on elementary civil liberties. 6 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 • 76 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 • 7
Introduction
Since the turn of the century, the discourse on aid and conditionality 
in low-income countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere has changed. 
Policy  Framework  Papers,  the  emanation  of  the  Structural  Adjustment 
Programmes imposed by the World Bank and IMF, have been replaced by 
purportedly home-grown Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP). One 
reason for this change of heart is that donors have come to acknowledge that 
government commitment, or “ownership”, is an important factor explaining 
the failure of past structural adjustment policies. The fact that the country 
is now to produce its own strategy paper is meant to increase such national 
“ownership”1. Local civil society (CS) can play an important role in broaden-
ing this ownership beyond the level of the government, but also in advocacy 
on behalf of the poor and in pressing for better governance (Tikare et al. 
2001). Participation of civil society has in effect become a prominent feature 
of the new discourse2.  This shift in focus creates its own set of problems. 
The World Bank, the architect but also the major arbiter of the new style, pro-
motes a rather ambitious version of participation: a one-size-fits-all, and an 
extra-extra-large one at that. In fact, the participation conditionality is very 
difficult to satisfy in the cultural and political setting of most low-income 
countries. The pragmatic way out has been for the Breton Woods institutions 
to be uncommonly lenient in the verification of this conditionality3. If thus an 
authoritarian political regime faces a lethargic civil society and donor repre-
sentatives who are not very critical, it may get away with a semblance of civil 
society consultation. In another context, characterised by effective space for 
policy debate, an alert civil society with well-articulated views, and insistent 
donors, the participation conditionality may well make a considerable differ-
ence. The outcome thus crucially depends on local settings and dynamics. In 
this paper we try to do find out how the participation game was played out in 
Rwanda, a country where the political regime is very authoritarian yet offer-
ing competent governance and using aid successfully, whereas civil society 
is unusually weak4. 
In the first section of the paper, we draw out the characteristics that 
government, civil society and donors must exhibit if the participation con-
ditionality is to achieve its intended effect. In a second section we look at 
Rwanda, which had its PRSP approved by the Breton Woods institutions in 
July 2002. The most influential donors declared themselves satisfied, and in 
some cases even enthusiastic, about how the participation condition had been 
fulfilled. This view was endorsed by some of the influential international non-
governmental organizations (NGOs) and is echoed in the academic literature. 
In sharp contrast to this rosy picture, we try to show that there has been very 
little civil society participation in Rwanda to date. Moreover our analysis 
suggests that any other outcome would have been unlikely, and possibly even 
undesirable. The excited participation rhetoric is in fact not very helpful when 
donors attempt to “strengthen” civil society or increase its political role help-
1 Not that the traditional ingredi-
ents of structural adjustment poli-
cies are absent. The strategy doc-
uments  may  be  home  produced, 
but they still have to be endorsed 
by the donors, and in particular 
the executive boards of the World 
Bank and the IMF. Probably as 
a  consequence,  all  the  PRSPs 
produced to date are cast in a neo-
liberal  mould  (Craig  and  Porter 
2003), and a satisfactory record 
with  structural  adjustment  poli-
cies remains a separate prerequi-
site for reaching the “completion 
point”  where  full  HIPC  debt 
relief is being granted.
2  Donors  tend  to  define  civil 
society in rather loose ways. As 
we are trying to understand their 
logic we will not challenge their 
use of the notion. Note however 
that,  for  pragmatic  reasons,  we 
do not, in this paper, extend our 
discussion to the private for profit 
sector, nor to the media.
3 The WB and IMF staff do not 
evaluate the participation process 
as  such  –  this  would  constitute 
a  political  judgment  for  which 
they  feel  they  have  no  mandate 
–  but  they  verify  that  some  par-
ticipation  has  been  organized 
and  assess  its  consequences  on 
the financial, economic, technical 
quality of the PRSP.
4  For  our  analysis  of  the  very 
contrasting experience of Bolivia, 
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ful in concrete country settings. In the third section of the paper we discuss 
the confusion created by the well intentioned but unrealistic participation 
rhetoric. Our own position is that for reasons of both intellectual honesty and 
policy effectiveness, donors should dramatically tune down their ambitions, 
and set country-specific, limited but firm benchmarks that a government 
must respect in its relations with civil society. If this had been done from the 
initial stages of the Rwandan Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS), some small 
but significant steps forward could have been taken that stand in stark con-
trast with the hollow “participation” actually offered to civil society in some 
limited areas where it was not ready to rise to the challenge, while at the same 
time the donor community did little to protect civil society when the regime 
was clamping down on elementary civil liberties. The findings in this paper 
are based on extensive literature study and a field trip to Rwanda in January 
2003. During our stay in Rwanda we interviewed a wide range of stakehold-
ers coming from civil society, the government and the donor community. A 
complete list of the people we met is available on request
1.  The PRS architecture
    The participation conditionality is the logical outcome of evolv-
ing donor thinking. In particular it is the reflection of the view that what 
stops low-income countries from following the right development path is 
political rather than merely technical-macroeconomic in nature. One of the 
conclusions from the literature on structural adjustment is that government 
“ownership” is crucial (World Bank 1998). Donors, in devising the new PRS 
architecture, felt that ownership should be broader than just the government. 
Ideally, academics, the media, trade unions, development NGOs and other 
actors of civil society would share the broad outlines of the strategy. Such 
broader based ownership would be achieved through dialogue and open de-
bate, and thus it was argued that civil society involvement in the preparation 
of the PRSP and in overseeing its implementation would be desirable. It was 
further expected that civil society would defend the interest of the poor, and 
thus make the resulting strategy more effective than it would otherwise be. 
Finally, civil society was also to play the role of watchdog. Donors were keen 
to make governments more accountable to their own populations. This was 
also part of the new, more political interpretation of what was wrong with 
low-income countries. Following the same line of thinking, we will not value 
participation by civil society, i.e. by organisations intermediating between the 
individual and the state, as a goal in itself, but rather as a means to develop-
ment and democracy, including the participation of individual citizens.
Table 1 sets out for the three objectives of ownership, effectiveness, and 
accountability what is expected of government, civil society, and donors, for 
civil society participation to make a meaningful contribution. We discuss the 
different cells in turn. We do not explicitly address the longer term, systemic 
contribution that civil society participation may eventually make to democ-8 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 • 9
racy. We acknowledge that such effects may indeed be important, arguably 
more important than those described here, but they will only materialize if 
the conditions for civil society described in the table are fulfilled.
Table 1: PRS dimensions and actors
Ownership Effectiveness Accountability 
Government 1.1
• technical expertise to prepare PRSP  
and apply participative techniques 
(technocratic ownership)
• highest level commitment to PRS 
(political ownership)
• widespread support for PRS within 
government (bureaucratic ownership)
1.2
• quality of poverty diagnostic
• quality of planning-budgetting-
implementation
• low corruption
• strong and stable institutions
1.3
• bureaucratic instruments for public 
sector monitoring and auditing (lateral 
accountability)
• willingness to account to donors 
(upward accountability)
• political room for genuine CS 
contribution and willingness to share 
information  (downward accountability) 
Civil Society  2.1
• representativeness
• autonomy vis-à-vis the state
• embeddedness
•  proximity to the poor
2.2
• ability to assess micro and 
macro needs of the poor
2.3
• capacity to evaluate government policies
• negotiating and organizational skills
• voice 
Donors 3.1
• accept recipient priorities as expressed 
in PRSP
• adapt aid procedures to allow maximum 
government control over aid resources
• co-ordinate with other donors
3.2
• pro-poor aid policies
3.3
• willingness to exert joint donor pressure 
and request effective accountability
• make “political space” for CS and 
important issue in policy dialogue
• support CSOs with advice and finance in 
their macro functions
 
Conditions regarding the State
Ownership (cell 1.1)
There must be ownership at several levels within the public sector be-
fore it can eventually be broadened to civil society. First, the government ap-
paratus must acquire the skills and expertise to develop a home-grown poverty 
strategy. With senior staff on hand to explain the PRS, amend it when needed, 
and closely advise policy makers, the strategy stands a much better chance 
of serving as the basis of actual policies. In addition, the organization by the 
public sector of hearings, seminars, and debates with civil society requires a 
technocratic mastery of participatory techniques. Choosing a technique or a 
combination of techniques from the wealth of instruments that exist is not a 
simple task. The issues under discussion, their complexity, the outcomes ex-
pected from the process, the composition of the participant group, the profile 
of the participants, the timeframe and the budget all play an important role 
in planning the depth, width and length of a participation process. Of course, 
without a firm political commitment, the strategy also risks being abandoned. 
The highest authorities must therefore be convinced that PRS reforms must be 
enacted, and they must show a keen interest in targeting the poor. Last, for a 
PRS to be effective, it should be used as a basic reference in setting and enact-
ing policies at all levels of government. Thus knowledge of the strategy and 
support for it must be spread wide enough for it to transpire in the day-to-day 
actions of lower ranking bureaucrats. There must therefore be ownership at 
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three levels: technocratic, political, and bureaucratic. This threefold owner-
ship is rendered precarious, but not impossible, by the fact that the locus of 
initiative of the whole approach is situated at the Breton Woods institutions, 
something local actors are keenly aware off  (Booth 2003:155).
Effectiveness (cell 1.2)
The PRS approach will only be effective, in the sense of showing tangi-
ble and lasting pro-poor results, if the quality of the diagnostic underlying the 
strategy is solid, and this is therefore a first condition. Even so, dependable 
strategic plans have no impact unless and until they are translated into the 
nitty-gritty of annual budgets, and carefully implemented. It is now gener-
ally accepted that the traditional planning and budgeting process through 
multi-annual  public  investment  plans  (PIP),  mainly  composed  of  donor 
funded investment projects, not integrated with the recurrent budget, and 
poorly articulated with national sector priorities, leads to a strong disconnect 
between planning and implementation. A Medium Term Expenditure Frame-
work (MTEF) is now advocated by the Breton Woods institutions as the best 
way to restore the balance and to ensure integration of planning, budgeting 
and implementation.  Even if all the foregoing conditions are met, the PRS 
is under threat from rampant and widespread corruption and incompetence, 
and weak and unstable public institutions. In this sense, general institutional 
strengthening is part and parcel of the effort to improve effectiveness. To 
conclude: if a minimum standard of pro-poor effectiveness is not achieved 
on the government side, it is highly unlikely that involving civil society will 
put things right.
Accountability (cell 1.3)
A precondition for any accountability mechanism to work is that there 
must be adequate financial reporting on public spending and its effect on the 
poor.  Without that, there is no way to trace the pro-poor effectiveness of the 
PRS. Note that as donor support in the context of PRS is shifting towards sec-
tor and budget support, and as fungibility makes that aid, even if earmarked, 
supports the whole budgetary effort the government, donors increasingly 
request insight in the overall performance of the government, rather than 
only detailed accounts of what happens with the money spent on specific 
interventions. This raises awkward questions as to the nature of the new re-
lationship. It is claimed that PRS puts the government in the driving seat. Yet 
the new logic drives donors to request oversight over the whole of government 
spending, irrespective of the origin. This makes the country more dependent 
on external control than was the case before. Accountability must also be es-
tablished vis-à-vis civil society. To do so, the political space must be created 
for civil society organisations (CSOs) to play the role assigned to them. This 
supposes that the government provides the opportunity structure that allows 
citizens to get together, organize, express opinions, and voice discontent. Vi-
tal is also that government provides civil society timely and adequate access 
to information and relevant documents. This merits emphasis, as in many low-
income countries the prevailing bureaucratic culture of secrecy and disdain of 
citizen’s rights militates against CSOs’ access to information.10 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 • 11
Civil society conditions
Ownership (cell 2.1)
The highly technical nature of many of the topics that crop up in the 
context of PRS makes that they can only be discussed in relatively small set-
tings and among experts. Is it necessary that the people who are taking part 
in those meetings on behalf of civil society are representative, in the sense of 
having received a formal mandate through a transparent selection process? 
Or is it enough that they are embedded, in the sense that they have strong 
links and empathy with the groups on behalf of whom they speak? One might 
argue that if they are not formally representing the rank-and-file members, 
they are in no position to act as brokers between society and the government, 
hence broad-based ownership is unlikely to be achieved. The representation 
logic however contains the danger of resulting in conflict between organized 
groups representing diverging interests, rather than in consensus (Leftwich 
2000; Edwards & Foley 1998). And since poor people tend to be poorly or-
ganized (Putnam 1993; Inglehart 1997), representation in PRS debates may 
actually work in favour of vested, powerful and organized interests, instead 
of the unorganized and voiceless poor. A balance has therefore to be struck 
between the representation logic and the pro-poor aim of the PRS. Care must 
be taken that well-embedded groups that work for and with the poor and in-
stitutions that are specialized in assessing poverty have a strong input in the 
discussions, even if some of them do not respond to the bottom-up representa-
tive logic.
Effectiveness (cell 2.2)
Activities undertaken by CSOs to influence government must not auto-
matically be considered to lead to better pro-poor outcomes. Success in this 
respect will depend on a number of qualities which CSOs must exhibit. There 
must be a genuine desire to act on behalf of the poor.  CSOs must further have 
the capacity to grasp the nature of poverty in the country, and assess the im-
pact of policies. This requires both proximity to the poor and analytical skills. 
All this must be accompanied by negotiating and lobbying skills. Usually 
such capacities are mainly present in specialised research organisations and 
some of the larger, more professional CSOs (trade unions, farmer federations, 
second line NGOs, platform organisations).
Accountability (cell 2.3)
Governments worldwide are good at making promises. But unless they 
are held accountable in ways that have consequences for their stay in power, 
politicians may well promise the sky, and deliver little. Donors are under-
standably keen, given the political diagnosis they are making, of fostering 
national, downward accountability5. They insist that civil society be involved 
in monitoring PRS implementation. This among others means that CSOs try 
to “follow the money” to see that it effectively reaches those intended. While 
performing their monitoring task, CSOs need to liaise downward to the grass-
roots and horizontally among advocacy organisations. The larger individual 
organisations must assign sufficient staff time to study PRSP documents, take 
5 It has been often remarked that 
the PRS does not see a compara-
bly enhanced role for parliament . 
We do not expand on this impor-
tant dimension here, but it is dif-
ficult to imagine how civil society 
could play its watchdog function 
in the absence of a proper politi-
cal accountability system.12 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 • 13
positions and prepare meetings. If civil society wants to lay any claim to le-
gitimacy when holding the government accountable, it is furthermore impera-
tive that the organisations composing it themselves are held accountable in 
one way or another. Their legitimacy will in part depend on their functioning, 
transparency, and their way of reconnecting back to society. More funda-
mentally, accountability and the bottom-up construction of the organisational 
fabric are of primary importance for achieving the second-round effects ex-
pected from civil society participation, in particular democratic development. 
Being involved in organisations is arguably the ultimate learning school for 
democracy, provided the organisations themselves are internally democratic 
(Boussard 2002). Finally, CSOs must challenge the government, firmly but 
constructively. It is far from evident that CSOs have the courage to do this in 
authoritarian or repressive political environments.
Conditions regarding the donor community
Ownership (cell 3.1)
The PRS is meant to constitute a new contract between donors and 
recipients, where the latter are firmly in the driver’s seat. This requires a new 
attitude on the part of the donors, and new instruments. If donors stick to their 
old ways, micromanaging their interventions outside the recipient’s budget, 
then there is no meaningful way in which aid-dependent recipients can gain 
effective ownership. Civil society participation will in such unfavourable cir-
cumstances not make much of a difference. The question here thus is whether 
donors honour their side of the new aid contract or whether they just pay lip-
service to it.
Effectiveness (cell 3.2)
The fact that much of the resources to finance the PRS come from aid, 
makes that donors wield enormous power, even in cases the recipient govern-
ment has “ownership” over the strategy finally agreed upon. Therefore the 
pro-poor effectiveness of the PRS crucially depends on donor priorities. If 
donors do not have a genuine interest in fostering a pro-poor development 
strategy, then they will in effect undermine its outcome by bringing in their 
own conflicting priorities. And again, it is unlikely that civil society partici-
pation will put things right.
Accountability (cell 3.3)
Donors play a crucial role in this respect as well. Traditionally they in-
sisted on strict accounting by the recipient government for the use of aid mon-
ies. In the context of PRS they are asked to relax the accounting at the micro-
level, and replace it by higher level, sector and macroeconomic justifications. 
Whenever possible they should rely on the country’s own budget control and 
auditing mechanisms. This is linked to an increasing emphasis on budget sup-
port and other non-project types of funding which require their own account-
ing procedures, such as joint public expenditure reviews by the government 
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space for civil society to play a role in downward accountability. After all, 
we are dealing with a scenario of externally driven change where the rules of 
the game in the country change ahead of underlying political culture. At the 
same time CSOs, including those engaged in networking and advocacy work, 
must be strengthened to take on the complex and challenging responsibilities 
bestowed upon them. Too much external interference or money however may 
do more harm than good, and donors must have a good understanding of the 
local dynamics and be prepared to take a long time perspective. 
Our brief roundup of the major issues suggests that civil society par-
ticipation will produce the best results in a context that boils down to a state 
that is development oriented and that respects civil liberties, a dynamic if not 
necessarily yet fully developed civil society and a committed and coordinated 
donor community. But what happens if these pre-conditions are not, or only 
very partially, fulfilled?
2.  Civil society participation in the Rwandan PRSP
    The setting
   
    Rwanda is among the 20 poorest countries worldwide. In 2001 
its GNI per capita (following the World Bank Atlas method) stood at $220, 
against $430 for Sub Sahara Africa (World Bank 2003). 60% of the popula-
tion live below the poverty line (MINECOFIN 2002:13). It took four years for 
the economy to recover from the consequences of the 1994 genocide. Even 
so, child mortality was higher in the period 1996-2000 than it was in the late 
1980s, and the health situation is compounded by a rate of HIV prevalence 
among adults of close to 14% (MINECOFIN 2002: 21). Since the Rwandan 
Patriotic Front (RPF) won a military victory that put a stop to the killings and 
installed a Government of National Unity, high growth rates have prevailed. 
Although such strong economic performance has only been possible thanks 
to the stability of the country and cautious economic management, it also re-
flects important transient factors, such as the resumption of economic activity 
and a reconstruction boom, that mask serious structural problems (MINE-
COFIN 2003a: 10). Agriculture, which is the mainstay of the economy, with 
a contribution to GDP of 40%, is suffering from serious weaknesses. Expan-
sion of area under cultivation reached its limit somewhere in the mid-1980s, 
and with continued high population growth of close to 3% and a population 
to land ratios of more than 300 persons per km2 - one of the highest in Africa 
- things are not improving (MINECOFIN 2003b:17). In the absence of inputs 
and new technologies land productivity is declining. Less than 20% of the 
population lives in towns, and there is no major industrial activity to speak 
of.  The basis for exports (mainly agricultural produce) is weak, and Rwanda 
is small and landlocked. With negligible domestic savings and low tax ratios, 
it will remain aid dependent for a long time to come. In this last regard, the 14 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 • 15
country cannot complain: it has continued to receive considerable amounts of 
development aid after the 1994 events. Between 1999 and 2001 for instance 
Official  Development  Assistance  to  Rwanda  was  a  massive  18%  of  GNI 
(OECD 2003), suggesting an unusual degree of generosity on the parts of do-
nors but also exceptional aid dependence. Rwanda is on the list of the Highly 
Indebted Poor Countries (HIPCs). It prepared an interim PRSP in November 
2000 that was endorsed just before the end of 2000 by the World Bank and the 
IMF. The full PRSP was finalised in June 2002 and approved in July 2002.
Ethnic tensions between the majority Hutu and the minority Tutsi have 
been high since before independence in 1962, and the 1994 frenzy of killings 
in which tens of thousands of Rwandans actively participated can only be 
understood against this background (Prunier 1995). More than half a million 
people were killed, millions fled their homes, infrastructure was ransacked, 
and the social fabric of society was torn apart. The civil society that existed 
before the genocide is tainted in the eyes of many because it has been instru-
mental in the organisation of the genocide as much if not more than constitut-
ing a factor of restraint. Civil society today is weak and under reconstruction 
(Unsworth & Uvin 2002).  The regime is ethnically dominated by the Tutsi 
minority that was the target of most of the killings. The political opportunity 
structure is kept tightly closed to the point of suffocation (ICG 2002), and the 
country scores very poorly in international comparisons on civil and politi-
cal liberties. Freedom House gives it a “combined” rating (political freedom 
plus civil liberties) of 6 out of 7 (7 being the worst possible state) in 2003, 
half a point down form 2002, and rated the country as not free (Freedom 
House 2003). Yet there are also genuine efforts on the part of the state at de-
centralisation and national reconciliation, reasonably fair local elections were 
held in 2001, and general elections are being prepared for the second part of 
2003. State power is concentrated in the hands of a small RPF-dominated 
inner circle and it is unclear how decision-making takes place in that group 
(Unsworth & Uvin 2002:6). Parliament, which is by excellence the agency 
to control government, is not able to perform its tasks in Rwanda. Rwanda’s 
Transitional National Assembly (TNA) was brought into existence through 
the 1993 Arusha Agreement. A power-sharing agreement divided the seats 
among the principal parties that did not participate in the genocide (USAID 
2002:19). The institution is incapable of exercising its powers to the full, since 
the executive is able to dissolve the TNA, and there is no mechanism to re-
convene it (USAID 2002:29). A new constitution, approved by referendum in 
2003, does not seem to fundamentally change this legislative vacuum, given 
the tight control the regime wants to keep over actors, issues and the space in 
which they can move.
In the following paragraphs we return to the matrix format of table 1, 
focusing in turn on the intersections of three actors (government, civil society 
and donors) and three dimensions (ownership, pro-poor effectiveness and ac-
countability) to discuss the extent to which the conditions for successful civil 
society participation were actually fulfilled in Rwanda.14 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 • 15
The Government of Rwanda
Ownership (1.1 in table 1 above)
The PRSP prepared by Rwanda has been very well received by the 
donor community (IDA/IMF 2002) to the point of being considered best prac-
tice (Mutebi et al. 2003: 269). The Interim PRSP and the final PRSP were pre-
pared by a separate unit, the National Poverty Reduction Programme (NPRP), 
set up within the Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning, staffed by 
handpicked officials, and generously supported by the donors, in particular 
U.K. bilateral cooperation (DFID) and UNDP. Only in 2002 was this unit 
fully integrated in the Ministry. As in many other countries major parts of 
the PRSP document were prepared by expatriate experts. Nevertheless most 
of the people we talked to were of the opinion that technocratic ownership of 
the PRS is considerable. Only limited participatory expertise was present in 
the Rwandan administration, but the government hired expertise from Inter-
national NGOs (Action Aid) and the National University of Butare to organ-
ize participatory processes such as the National Poverty Assessment and the 
Policy Relevance Test (see later). There is general agreement that there was 
considerable support for the PRS and the underlying policies at the highest 
level of the government. The top people in government and president Kagame 
were highly committed. The joint staff assessment of the PRSP by the World 
Bank and the IMF acknowledges this (IDA/IMF 2002:2). The weakest link in 
the public sector is constituted by the line Ministers, the decentralised level, 
and from a different angle, by lower ranking bureaucrats, including those 
in the central Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning. Although many 
know about the PRS, and considerable efforts are put in place to give them ap-
propriate training, it does not necessarily mean that they feel co-responsible 
for it (Mutebi et al. 2003:258).  All in all, we conclude that there is consider-
able national ownership within the public sector, so that efforts to build on it 
and deepen it through civil society participation certainly look meaningful.
Effectiveness (1.2)
The way in which the poverty diagnostic was organised has received 
considerable praise from experts (Mutebi et al. 2001), but also from Interna-
tional NGOs such as Christian Aid (Painter 2002) and ActionAid  (Zaman 
2002). The full PRSP was produced on the basis of two participative mecha-
nisms designed specifically to gather information on poverty: the National 
Poverty Assessment and the Policy Relevance Test6. The National Poverty 
Assessment  has  been  broadened  into  the  so-called  Ubudehe7.  There  was 
general appreciation for the resulting diagnostic from all the people we in-
terviewed, both donors and civil society actors. This serves as an illustration 
of the overall effectiveness of the Rwandan post-1994 state. The point made 
by Unsworth & Uvin (2002:6) that; despite the glaring democratic deficit, the 
Rwandan state is in some respects stronger and more institutionalised than 
most African states was widely echoed during our interviews, even by those 
donors who were otherwise very critical.
6  The  National  Poverty  Assess-
ment gathered data on the levels 
and  nature  of  poverty  and  was 
conducted  at  the  level  of  the 
smallest administrative unit, the 
“cellule”.  About  a  1000  cellules 
were  consulted.  In  Butare  the 
analysis of poverty was taken to 
the  household  level.  The  Policy 
Relevance Test tried to figure out 
what people think about policies 
the government proposed. About 
10000 people were consulted for 
the  latter.  In  2002  the  exercise 
was  broadened  to  the  national 
level.
7  Ubudehe  is  the  traditional 
Rwandan  practice  of  digging 
fields  before  the  rains  come 
and  the  planting  season  arrives. 
Groups of households tend to help 
each other with these tasks. This 
collective  action  mechanism  is 
very inclusive, covering all social 
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A good poverty diagnostic is one thing, a coherent strategy to tackle 
poverty is quite another. In a multi-country evaluation of HIPC, the World 
Bank is very critical about most PRSPs produced so far (OED 2003). All of 
them stress increased social spending, especially in education and health, but 
most often they do not convincingly address the basic fact that the poor just 
lack sufficient income-generating opportunities. At first sight the Rwandan 
PRSP seems to score better in this regard. Most of the extra resources from 
debt relief are earmarked for immediate investment in support of the agricul-
tural sector, where most of the poor live8. But this does not add up to a proper 
pro-poor strategy. In fact the Rwandan PRSP professes a strong belief in the 
trickle-down effects of growth. Most of the poor are small peasants, hence a 
broad-based effort to boost agricultural growth, together with targeted health 
and education spending will reduce poverty, so the reasoning goes. Although 
growth is an absolute prerequisite for poverty reduction, no mechanisms have 
been designed to make it explicitly pro-poor. Yet there is evidence of strong 
and growing inequality in Rwanda. The PRSP acknowledges the problem. 
The Gini-coefficient of inequality for instance, calculated for 2001, stands at 
0.46 whereas it is estimated that in the mid-1980s it was only 0.27 (MINE-
COFIN 2002: 18)9. Will economic grow reduce the urban-rural divide, or the 
intra-regional or local inequalities? The joint WB/IMF staff assessment of 
the PRSP document is rightly critical in this respect (IDA/IMF 2002:4). What 
for instance about the large number of usually female-headed households who 
lack access to sufficient family labour inputs, because family members have 
been killed in the genocide, or because they are still in prison, or because of 
illness? And what about the hundreds of thousands of Rwandan peasants who 
just do not have access to enough land to make a living? The land issue is very 
complex and divisive in Rwanda, and may in some cases have contributed to 
the killings of 1994 (Andre and Platteau 1998). A fairly confused legal situ-
ation prevails, caused by conflicting customary legal practices, and a super-
imposed “modern” law, leading to insecurity in land access for the poor. The 
government has prepared new legislation to strike a balance between these 
different legal logics (André 1998). But that cannot solve the problem that 
with present and foreseeable agricultural technologies many poor farmers 
just have not enough land. A related question is the resettlement of refugees. 
Several hundred thousands Tutsi refugees returned to Rwanda after the new 
regime came to power in 1994. Many more Hutu fled the country during the 
period of the genocide, a large part of whom returned later. According to the 
PRSP document, a massive 3.5 million Rwandan people (out of a total popula-
tion of 8.2 million) resettled as a consequence of the turmoil created by the 
war and the genocide (MINECOFIN  2003: 27). The Arusha Agreement of 
1993 stipulated that returning refugees who had left the country more than 
ten years before could not reclaim their previous land holdings, but would 
be settled by the government on new land. Most of the Tutsi refugees were 
in that situation. The new regime accepted the Arusha Agreement, but faced 
considerable problems in providing shelter, and in the case of rural areas, 
providing access to arable land to all these refugees. In contrast, the mainly 
Hutu refugees who had fled Rwanda during or in the immediate aftermath of 
8  Social  sector  pending  only 
represents  33% of the extra re-
sources Rwanda expects to spend 
as  a  consequence  of  HIPC  debt 
relief  and  additional  donor  sup-
port  (MINECOFIN  2002).  The 
multi-country  average  in  the 
World Bank study is around 65%, 
or almost double the Rwanda fig-
ure (OED 2003: 35)
9  Remarkably,  the  first  PRS 
progress  report  seems  to  back-
track on this point. After stating 
that,  on  the  basis  of  available 
data for Rwanda, changes in in-
equality  over  time  are  difficult 
to  ascertain,  thereby  distancing 
itself from the analysis made in 
the original PRSP, the report fur-
ther  downplays  the  whole  issue 
as follows: “Whereas inequality 
may not be as a serious issue in 
Rwanda  as  in  some  other  coun-
tries  in  the  region  existence  of 
differentiation in the rural sector 
and between the rural and urban 
sector is certainly notable” (MI-
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the genocide in principle could reclaim their lands upon their return. The gov-
ernment initiated a policy of resettlements, called “imidugudu” that became 
linked to the land issue. In a well-documented report, the international NGO 
Human Rights Watch has claimed that many people have been forcibly moved 
from their own land into imidugudu, as part of an ill-conceived and badly 
implemented policy of villagisation that the government of Rwanda initiated 
around 1996. The confiscated land was then given to other refugees, which 
among other things may have exacerbated ethnic tensions10, or used to form 
large  commercial  farms  (Human  Rights  Watch  2001).The  WB/IMF  joint 
assessment calls these policies “controversial” (IDA/IMF 2002:7) and sev-
eral donors indicated to us that they are shying away from supporting them 
financially, although some of them have done so in the past. There are good 
reasons to believe that a generalised villagisation policy in Rwanda is bound 
to be as disastrous as similar policies in Tanzania in the 1970s and Ethiopia in 
the 1980s, with people suffering directly at the hand of a repressive govern-
ment and indirectly from the dire economic consequences of the policy. This 
discussion is revealing about the PRSP as a strategy document. In fact the 
PRSP only briefly mentions the imidugudu policy, but does so unquestionably 
(MINECOFIN 2002: 53). In this important respect at least, it certainly does 
not constitute to a convincing pro-poor strategy. The Rwandan government 
scores better, in the eyes of the donors, when it comes to translating its poli-
cies into budgets. There have been serious efforts in Rwanda to introduce the 
MTEF, although it is acknowledged that many weaknesses remain (Mutebi 
2003: 269).
Accountability (1.3)
In the Rwandan case it is useful to distinguish political from techno-
cratic accountability. On the technocratic level, the Rwandan government is 
engaged in serious reforms that aim at better financial accounting within 
the public sector, transparent public tendering procedures, an independent 
General Auditor’s Office, reform of Customs and Inland Revenue, and of the 
judiciary. Donors and experts we met during our field trip were generally 
fairly positive about the willingness of the government to push these reforms 
through and optimistic about their eventual effects, although inevitably there 
remains much to be done (IMF 2003). This is another instance of the donors 
appreciating Rwandan efforts to improve technocratic governance. In other 
words, the willingness of the Rwanda government to account to donors in a 
technocratic sense is good. Again most donors were positive during inter-
views. Interestingly, the government is also very outspoken in its advocacy of 
a new, PRS-style, aid relationship. In spite of extreme aid-dependence, there 
is not much sign of the government being subservient to the donor commu-
nity in any way. Government ministers will openly criticize donors for not 
providing more appropriate aid (i.e. budget support) or for not delivering in 
time, or for not keeping their financial promises. In the first progress report on 
the PRS a brief checklist to judge the quality of donors is pointedly included 
(MINECOFIN 2003a:72-73). On the political level, less willingness to be ac-
countable to donors can be found. Illustrative is the protracted involvement 
10  Although  in  general  Hutu 
and Tutsi farmers stand to profit 
equally  from  economic  growth 
and  pro-poor  policies,  the  imi-
dugudu policy could be strongly 
divisive,  as  it  may  lead  to  land 
being  taken  away  by  the  local 
authorities from one group to be 
allocated to another.  Given the 
strong ethnic sensitivities which 
continue to prevail in the country, 
and the fact that the people are 
keenly  aware  that  the  govern-
ment  is  controlled  by  the  Tutsi, 
land redistribution policies have 
the strong potential of being in-
flamatory.  See Storey (1999) for 
an analysis of how analogous per-
ceptions  about  the  ethnic  effect 
of structural adjustment policies 
prevailed in the period preceding 
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(1996-2002) of Rwanda in the war in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
and how the government strongly resisted donor pressure to withdraw. This 
caused a major split amongst donors. Donors like for example France and 
Belgium were of the opinion that the plunder and the human rights violations 
in neighbouring Democratic Republic of Congo should influence donor prac-
tices in Rwanda. They judged that under the circumstances general budget 
support was out of the question (DGCI 2002), as in all likelihood some of the 
money would be siphoned off to pay for the war effort. When it became clear 
that a considerable part of the war was probably financed from the extraction 
of mineral resources from the Democratic Republic of Congo (UN: 2001), 
they increased their pressure on the other donors to be tougher with Rwanda 
and use the overall aid as a weapon to force a solution. The Rwandan regime, 
for its part, remained adamant and only relented in the middle of 2002.
Regarding vertical downward accountability, the regime tends to see 
CSOs as holders of useful information on poverty (Bugingo and Painter 2002:
5), and as subcontractors for grass roots activities, but finds it extremely hard 
to accept them as partners in a policy dialogue. The regime is aware of the 
views and expectations of donors in this regard. In 2002 a Presidential Com-
mission on Civil Society was set up. At the end of a three-day conference in 
December 2002, president Kagame said that he welcomed criticism on policy 
issues if framed constructively11. But this belies a more troubling relationship. 
The rare Rwandan CSOs who have dared to be critical have experienced in-
timidation and enormous pressure.  We heard first-hand stories of how some 
were closed down, or financially threatened, or members of staff put in prison. 
Even those observers who have shown great understanding of the Rwandan 
regime admit to “a striking lack of policy debates” (Mutebi et al. 2003:262).
Civil Society
Ownership (2.1)
The basic conditions for civil society broadening the ownership of the 
PRS, through an upward constructive yet critical engagement with govern-
ment and downward feedback through a well relayed network of CSOs is 
just not fulfilled. There are a few networks but they lack the willingness or 
the capacity to play an important role. The interlocutors from the donor side 
who commented on this during interviews confirmed our diagnosis. When 
we asked CSO representatives who had attended meetings organised by the 
government in the context of the PRS whether they had had any input, even 
those who answered in the positive were unable to articulate what the effect 
had been. Tellingly, most had not had the time or the opportunity to read the 
final version of the PRSP, almost two years after it had been published!
Regarding the embeddedness and representativeness of civil society, 
most interviewees seemed to agree that the “visible”, organised part of civil 
society in Rwanda is mostly situated in the capital. Without necessarily ar-
guing that national organisations (among them the umbrella-organizations) 
11 communication from the Irish 
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reflect the interests of the intellectuals, or the middle class, to the detriment 
of the rural poor, the weak links with grass-roots organisations is regarded 
as problematic (USAID 2002a:35). Furthermore, it is often argued that cer-
tain cultural traits reproduce outcomes that are excessively vertical in nature. 
Rwandans, so it is said, suffer from a culture of obedience. Deference to 
authority combined with distrust of the same authority, is often mentioned 
as a key element of Rwandan society (USAID 2002a; USAID 2002b, Uvin 
2003). Surely under such circumstances the creation of a genuine feeling of 
ownership over a PRS is unlikely. For many of the donor representatives, civil 
society has to be gradually and slowly built up, and it will take a long time 
before it will play the role envisaged in the PRS scenario.
Effectiveness (2.2)
We often heard that nobody, not even Rwandan CSOs, really knows 
what the “people on the hills” really think or want. Interviewees also stated 
that civil society suffers from a lack of vision, synergy and analytical capacity. 
Rwandan CSOs have tended to be reactive, rather than proactive and strategic, 
and concentrate on day-to-day solutions to immediate problems (Bugingo & 
Painter 2002:7). Nevertheless, CSOs reportedly made two contributions that 
influenced the final PRSP. The first one concerned the World Bank defini-
tion of poverty used in the Interim PRSP. Organizations pleaded for a more 
precise and contextualized definition of poverty, which led to the organisa-
tion of the National Poverty Assessment. The second contribution related to 
the absence of gender in the Interim PRSP. Criticism by civil society was 
subsequently taken seriously into account, giving women a special considera-
tion during the participation process at the grass-root level. Although these 
changes were attributed to CSO input by government officials we spoke to, it 
is probably that similar comments were brought up by donors or by technical 
experts in the discussion of the Interim PRSP, so it is unclear how decisive 
civil society’s role really was.
Accountability (2.3)
Rwandan civil society does not possess the analytical skills to monitor 
and evaluate government policies, nor the capacity to mobilize internally and 
articulate common reactions. CSOs suffer from a serious lack of financial and 
human resources. Even the larger organisations complained to us that they 
could only get access to external resources when it concerned projects. Most 
of the staff is executing projects, while policy relevant work is left unattended. 
Nor are civil society networks well organised.  An initiative undertaken in 
the later part of 2000 to organize the larger, intermediate organisations in a 
Rwandan NGO-forum in order to co-ordinate their efforts and divide tasks 
during the PRS process, failed (Mutebi et al..2001b:14). This missed oppor-
tunity was caused, according to some of the people involved, by “a lack of 
resources, leadership and competences”. At the time of our field visit, Inter-
national NGOs, especially Christian Aid and Trocaire, continued to try to get 
the Rwandan umbrella-organizations involved in a national NGO-forum, but 
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Admittedly, challenging government is not without risk in such an 
authoritarian setting as Rwanda, which may explain the considerable discom-
fort we observed within civil society about playing such a role. Several people 
we met, both Rwandan and foreign, in fact suggested that many CSOs “co-
opt” people close to the regime, or, in another variant, that they are infiltrated 
by them. Whether true or not, the fact that this was relayed to us by several 
insiders, by itself testifies to the considerable degree of mistrust that exists 
within civil society. The following incident further suggests a glaring lack 
of autonomy. On the eve of the dissolution of the main opposition party in 
May 2003 - without convincing grounds but probably out of fear that it might 
prove an effective challenger to the ruling RPF during the upcoming elec-
tions - a meeting was organised by one of the larger NGOs, Pro-Femmes, and 
attended by representatives of a number of Rwandan NGOs, to denounce the 
opposition party and support its dissolution. Reyntjens (2003: 7) who reports 
the event, sarcastically notes that the recommendations of the meeting read 
like a press release of the RPF.
Our overall conclusion is that civil society at the beginning of PRS 
implementation is embryonic and unable to play even a timid role in holding 
the  government  accountable.    In  some  neighbouring  countries,  the  weak-
ness of lay civil society is compensated by the strength of the Churches. 
In Rwanda however this is not the case. After the genocide, the influential 
Catholic Church substantially withdrew from “public life” as it tried to come 
to terms with its role during the genocide. In encounters with CSOs, Church 
representatives were ambivalent whether they wanted to be regarded as part 
of civil society.
International NGOs active in Rwanda try to make up for some of the 
weaknesses of local CSOs. They are much better organised professionally and 
can get help from their international network for advocacy work. They are 
also better protected against intimidation because the international voice they 
can mobilise, at least up to the point where they risk being pestered out of the 
country. Thus they can boldly go where purely national NGOs fear to thread. 
A number of international NGOs are aware of this opportunity and are trying 
gradually to open up more space, in anticipation that one day, national CSOs 
will have the capacity and drive to do take over. But international NGOs, 
however well intentioned, also pose a threat to the emergence of a vigorous 
national civil society. The international NGOs are stronger, more powerful, 
more skilled, and they compete with local CSOs for funds from bilateral and 
multilateral donors and for local human resources. Revealingly, most Rwan-
dan civil society actors we interviewed perceived the international NGOs as 
donors, while the international NGOs themselves seemed to struggle with the 
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The Donor Community
Ownership (3.1)
There are good reasons to be critical about the willingness of donors 
to effectively co-ordinate amongst themselves and to adapt their aid instru-
ments to the new PRS architecture. This may well constitute a major im-
pediment to sustained success in a country as aid-dependent as Rwanda. All 
the donors we met welcomed the PRSP and said that it constituted a broad 
framework within which they planned their own aid programmes. However, 
the PRS discourse supposes much more on the part of the donor community. 
In Rwanda, donor reactions varied strongly. To understand why, some back-
ground information is necessary. Mention is often made of an opposition 
between the “new” donors (UK, the Netherlands, Sweden) and “old” donors 
(France, Belgium, Switzerland, Germany) (Da Cam‚ra 2001). The distinction 
refers to the relative length the donors have been present in Rwanda, and the 
fact that old donors were generous before the genocide but more reluctant, 
although still present and active, since, whereas the new donors have come 
in after 1994 and now top the league in terms of aid volumes. The distinction 
does not cover the whole range, as it leaves out multilateral donors that were 
important before and have remained so afterwards, such as the EC, the World 
Bank, or UNDP12. And the US, which had strongly supported the new regime 
under the Clinton administration (Lemarchand 1999), has under the Bush 
administration maintained moderate levels of aid but has become much more 
critical, both regarding the involvement of Rwanda in the regional conflict be-
yond its borders as in its internal restricting of civil liberties. Interestingly, the 
distinction between “old” and “new” also seems to apply to the instruments 
these donors apply in Rwanda. The “new” donors tend to make a positive 
evaluation of Rwanda, emphasizing developmental outputs such as stability 
and economic growth, rather than the political aspects relating to democracy. 
There relative trust in the regime has brought them to abandon traditional 
piece-meal donor-driven project aid, and to evolve towards sector and budget 
support13. This is laudable and fully in accordance with the PRS logic, since 
it passes responsibility and thus ownership in the hands of the government 
(Booth 2003:152).  The old donors however have serious misgivings in this 
respect. They feel that the new donors have been too readily swayed by the 
technocratic qualities of the government, and have seriously overlooked the 
political danger of giving budget support to a regime that is repressive, au-
thoritarian and mixed up in a regional conflict14. The World Bank and the 
IMF on their part have been criticised for not adapting their instruments to 
the new PRS context (Mutebi 2001b). The conclusion must be that notwith-
standing the move towards new aid instruments, led by the UK, most donors 
have not sufficiently adapted their aid instruments for Rwanda to be able to 
fully own the planning, budgeting and implementation of its own PRS.
Effectiveness (3.2)
It may well be that some donors modulate the size of their aid to Rwan-
da in function of their geopolitical views or commercial interests in the wider 
12 In the years 1992-1993, preced-
ing  the  genocide,  the  major  do-
nors to Rwanda were (in between 
brackets  average  annual  official 
development  aid  disbursements, 
as  reported  in  OECD(2003)): 
EC ($59 million), Germany ($ 41 
million),  Belgium  ($41  million), 
the  World  Bank  ($33  million), 
and  France  ($29  million).  By 
contrast,  in  2000-01,  the  major 
donors  were  the  World  Bank 
($51  million),  the  EC  ($47  mil-
lion),  the  United  Kingdom  ($45 
million), then United States ($27 
million) and the Netherlands ($10 
million).
13 According to budget documents 
prepared by MINECOFIN during 
2003,  recurrent  budget  support 
not linked to traditional projects 
will amount to around 7% of GNP 
annually in the period 2002-2004. 
(personal  communication  to  the 
authors). However not all of this 
is flexible budget support in the 
sense  envisaged  in  the  PRS  ap-
proach.
14  Whereas  in  Rwanda  the  new 
donors,  through  the  larger  size 
of  their  aid  programmes,  have 
much more influence than the old 
donors, the situation is different 
in the Executive Committees of 
the World Bank and IMF, where 
financial support to Rwanda has 
been met with much more reser-
vation.  This  may  partly  explain 
the  fairly  tough  stand  the  IMF 
has been taken in recent years in 
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region. But within the confines of their Rwanda aid portfolio, donors seem 
honest in their insistence on addressing poverty, and genuinely supportive of 
the poverty focus of the PRS. This is therefore not an impediment to pro-poor 
effectiveness, or a contribution in this regard from civil society.
Accountability (3.3)
We have already indicated that the donor community is divided over 
Rwanda. As a consequence, the accountability debate in which donors engage 
with the Rwandan authorities with respect to the use of aid resources is mostly 
uncoordinated, although the new donors, in particular the UK, Sweden, and 
the Netherlands, do work closely together. When it comes to joint negotiations 
with the Rwandan government on for instance the PRSP document itself or its 
implementation, an overall donor position is often lacking. As a consequence 
donor influence is not so strong as could have been the case.  The feeble reac-
tion to the ill-advised imidugudu policy discussed above is a case in point.
It is not only upward accountability that is important. In Rwanda the 
drive towards more downward accountability is externally driven. Unless 
donors pressure the Rwandan authorities to open space for CSOs, the lat-
ter will not be able or daring to speak up on development issues or disagree 
with the official line. Most donors stated to us that the situation of civil so-
ciety in Rwanda is problematic, partly because of the treatment it gets from 
the regime. In its strategy paper on Rwanda the EC openly states that par-
ticipation of civil society is insufficient, and sharply criticizes the law on the 
registration of CSOs (EC 2003:7). And the UK, in its strategy paper, states: 
“DFID’s engagement in Rwanda is predicated on the Government remaining 
committed to progressively securing all human rights for its citizens, and 
to establishing a fair and transparent framework for the operation of civil 
society and the media” (DFID 23003:2). Donors are also convinced that they 
can help civil society by providing institutional and financial support, so that 
in some not yet determined point in the future it will be able to take up the 
role envisaged in the PRS scenario. Most have budget lines for this purpose, 
operated by their local representations. USAID efforts in particular seem to 
resort under a coherent and well articulated long-term strengthening strategy 
(USAID 2002a:53). Overall donors seem to take civil society strengthening 
fairly seriously. At the same time, not much of this support was visible in con-
tacts with CSOs on the ground. The overall impression we got when talking 
to intermediate, umbrella like organisations is that they were left to their own 
devices. Donors lamented the lack of capacity in national intermediate CSOs, 
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3.  How helpful is the donor rhetoric about civil society?
    Let us recapitulate some of the points we made, and draw them 
together in a few final comments. Like most people who have been in contact 
with the technocrats in charge of PRS in Rwanda we were struck by their 
sincere conviction that civil society should be involved and their many efforts 
at bringing CSOs to the table. During the preparation of the PRSP, invitations 
were circulated, and a number of meetings were held, which representatives 
of civil society duly attended and where they, however timidly, raised certain 
issues. Formally at least, Rwanda went through the paces that allowed the do-
nors to state that the participation conditionality was met. In contrast to many 
donors, international NGOs and analysts, we did not however find convincing 
evidence of genuine civil society participation. The poverty assessments re-
ported on in this paper, initiated by the Rwandan government with the help of 
contracted experts, and using local administrative structures, however com-
petent and however participative they may have been, do not for us constitute 
a participation of civil society. In fact, autonomous local organisations were 
kept at a distance, and national CSOs were not involved in any significant way. 
And civil society did not have more than a token input in the final formulation 
of the PRSP document.
Our findings should not come as a surprise. In fact, given the historical 
and political context of Rwanda, they were perfectly predictable. Although 
the Rwandan state has espoused the new PRS approach enthusiastically and 
has shown good technocratic governance, it is also very authoritarian and 
unwilling to let civil society play a role in the policy debate. Threats to civil 
society, and outright repression by part of the state apparatus, were occurring 
at the same time that civil society was “participating” in the preparation of the 
PRSP. Donors apparently were of the opinion that more than this semblance of 
participation was at this stage either not possible or desirable. As pointed out 
in our introduction, donors, somewhat disingenuously, have not set credible 
minimum standards that have to be satisfied before a participation exercise is 
graded acceptable. Not surprisingly, their assessments of actual participation 
processes are perfunctory, and the Rwandan case illustrates this. 
But maybe it is just as well that donors did not push for more. As in 
all conditionalities, they must make complex decisions regarding timing and 
sequencing. There is no doubt that civil society participation is a good thing, 
eventually. But when, and in what sequence with other reforms should donors 
bring it to the negotiating table? The new aid discourse does not provide much 
guidance. By seeming to suggest that there is no real trade-off, and that eve-
rything can and must be had at the same time, it considerably obfuscates the 
issue. So donor representatives in the field have to navigate on their own com-
pass. They have certain things to go on. For instance, good technocratic gov-
ernance has to be achieved as soon as possible, without delay. But other things 
are more uncertain. Civil society participation, with its connotations of civil 
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culture, is part of a wider process of societal and political change, and optimal 
timing and sequencing is country-specific, and requires a careful mapping 
of the local socio-cultural and political dynamics. The scientific literature 
offers little guidance, and suggests caution if not outright scepticism at such 
external socio-political engineering. Sure, in the longer run, there is a statisti-
cal relation between democracy and prosperity (Inglehart 1997; Moore 1996). 
But this is not very helpful to aid administrators and policy makers. For in the 
short to medium rum, the relation between political regime and development 
is ambiguous indeed. Authoritarian government can show positive develop-
ment outcomes. Some scholars even identify democracy as an impediment for 
the earlier stages of socio-economic development. Democratic government, 
as they see it, is not necessarily wise government (Leftwich 1993:8; Leftwich 
1998; Landell-Mills 1992:10; Huntington 1991:209-210). Let us apply this to 
Rwanda. The eagerness of the Rwandan regime to provide good technocratic 
governance stands in stark contrast with its mean-spiritedness and frequent 
clamping down on civil society. Is Rwanda is emulating the successful East 
Asian success stories, where in a first historical stage strong, technocratic, 
output-oriented states dominate over muzzled civil societies, and the reins on 
civil liberty are kept very tight so as to provide stability and suit the economic 
growth imperative? Some political scientists may profess that this Asian ex-
ample cannot be successfully translated to an African setting (Sandbrook 
1996), but then to apply this conclusion to an individual country like Rwanda 
would be rather crude historical determinism. Its traumatic recent history, 
and the strong ethnic tensions simmering beneath the surface, seem to justify 
a support for a regime that, however authoritarian, is providing much needed 
stability, good technocratic governance, and it is addressing the issue of na-
tional reconciliation. The question for the donors then is whether the present 
Rwandan model of a strong development state and limited space for policy 
debate can work, and, if the answer to this first question is positive, whether 
the advantages of this path outweigh its obvious costs in terms of civil liber-
ties for the Rwandan people. And if the answer is again positive, they have to 
determine at what time in the future and how hard they will start pushing the 
regime to open up a space for civil society and to become more downward 
accountable. In all this, they have to realize that civil society must grow from 
the roots, and cannot be artificially pulled upwards by outside actors. In this 
sense, we have sympathy for the reluctance of donors to impose the participa-
tion conditionality more aggressively. At the same time, we deplore the over-
blown discourse that in the end may hamper good policies. By pretending, for 
the sake of convenience, to see levels of civil society participation that just 
are not there, donors become blind to violations of minimum benchmarks in 
the treatment of civil society by the regime, in particular in the realm of civil 
liberties. And despite all their budget lines and talk about strengthening civil 
society, intermediate CSOs in Rwanda did not receive, in the period under 
review, significant institutional support from the donors.24 • IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 IDPM-UA Discussion Paper 2003-05 • 25
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